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CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS -

CIVIL PROCEDURE

-

CHOICE OF LAW -

TORT

LI~rLrry WORxINOMAN'S COMPENSATION - NEW YORK OVERTURNS LEx
Loci DELICTI IN OUT-oF-STATE DEATH OF NEW YORK DoMIcIIARY.-Plain-

tiff's intestate, a resident of New York, died of asphyxiation in an oxygendeficient chamber of a submarine in Newport News, Virginia, one month after
commencing repair work on submarines under construction by Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company [Newport]. Prior to death, decedent
MacKendrick had resided with his family in Dunkirk, New York, for twenty-five
years. During that time he worked as a welder for his employer, Alco, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in New York state.
Defendant Newport had contracted with the United States Navy for the
construction of submarines. The Navy had also contracted with Westinghouse,
a Pennsylvania corporation, to install the air-conditioning systems. Westinghouse then contracted in Pennsylvania with Alco for the purchase of heat exchangers under an agreement providing that Alco would repair any defects in
the exchangers. Alco's contract was exclusively with Westinghouse; it had no
contract with defendant Newport.
Three months before MacKendrick's death, defects appeared in the heat
exchanger equipment. Westinghouse, the Navy, and Newport executed a repair
memo at Newport News requiring Alco personnel to arrive in Newport to make
the necessary repairs. Westinghouse then brought decedent into Virginia under
the repair provision of its contract with Alco. It was solely the inadequacy of
the heat exchange system that necessitated the presence of Alco and its employee
MacKendrick in Virginia.
For a month prior to death, decedent worked for Alco making the necessary repairs in the shipyard at Newport News. He lived in a motel nearby and
returned periodically to visit his family in New York. there was no indication
that he considered his presence in Virginia to be' other than temporary.
Plaintiff argued that since decedent was a domiciliary of New York, regularly employed in New York by a New York firm, and only temporarily in
Virginia, his death ought to be compensated under the Workingman's Compensation Act of New York state. Defendant, a Virginia corporation with only
a sales office in New York City, argued that since decedent lived and worked
in Virginia at the time of the accident, any recovery should come under the
provisions of the Workingman's Compensation Act of Virginia, which precludes
suit by the widow in such cases. In essence, defendent's appeal thus invoked
the doctrine of lex loci delicti. The New York Supreme Court held: New York
rather than Virginia law governs recovery because decedent had a greater
"grouping of contacts" with the former state. MacKendrick v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994, 302 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
In adopting New York law to govern recovery of a New York decedent
whose death occurred out of state, the MacKendrick court explicitly overturned
the blind application of the traditional lex loci delicti doctrine invoked by de-
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fendant.1 This venerable choice-of-law rule, embodied in the original Restatement2 and until recently generally followed by most states,' provides that substantive rights and liabilities arising from a tort be determined by the law of
the place of the tort, rather than by the law of the forum in which the suit is
brought - the lex fori.
Historically, the lex loci doctrine finds its conceptual foundation in the
vested rights theory, which maintains that a right to recover for a foreign tort
originates in the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends
for its existence and scope solely on that law.' In theory both right and liability
originate at the time and place of the wrong and follow the parties into whatever other juridictions they enter.
Although espoused by judges such as Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican
R.R.5 and by authoritative scholars such as Professor Beale, 6 the vested rights
doctrine recently has been accused with increasing tempo of failing to notice
underlying policy considerations in the conflict between the lex loci and the
lex fori doctrines The vice of the venerable vested rights theory allegedly lies
in that "it affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state
the practical considerations involved . . . . "s The mechanical rigor of lex loci
precludes consideration of plaintiff's ties with his domiciliary state as well as
of that state's interest in protecting its citizens from discrimination by laws of
1 MacKendrck v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994,
302 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Literally, lex loci delicti means "the law of the place of the
wrong," its import being that the law of the place of the wrong takes precedence over the law
of the forum. Generally, the place where injury is sustained is the place of the wrong.
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).

"The prevailing American view has been

that the law of the place of the injurious effect of the defendant's conduct determines liability."
G. STRUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 181 (3d ed. 1963). On the issue of measure
of damages,
[t~he law of the place of wrong governs the amount of recovery for wrongful death
as well as the right to recover. Thus, any limitation upon the amount imposed by the
law of the place of wrong will be applicable to determine the maximum amount
recoverable elsewhere. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 391, comment d at 480
(1934). For further discussion, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1930).
3 Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12, 15 (1964).
4 Note, 21 VAND. L. REv. 266 (1968).
5 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject
to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person
may be found.... But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of
the act, it follows that that law determines not only merely the existence of the obligation ... but equally determines its extent. Id. at 126.
The erosion of this doctrine has been recognized in subsequent decisions. E.g., Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). That case notes with approval the departures by some state
courts from the lex loci practice. Id. at 15. See Note, 21 VAND. L. Rxv. 266 (1968).
6 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1286-92 (1935).
7 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173, 178 (1933);
Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. RF.V.
361, 379-85 (1945); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 457, 478 (1924); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. CH. L.
REv. 463 (1960). On factors influencing the choice of conflicting laws, see Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 746-49 (1924); Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
8 Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 482-83
(1928). For criticism of the vested rights theory, see Cavers, supra note 7; Cook, supra note
7; Comment, The "Grouping of Contacts" Rule as a Basis for Resolving Conflicts of Law, 20
RUTGERS L. REv.572 (1966).
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other states. While its advantages of uniform treatment and discouragement of
forum shopping are worthwhile ideals, the lex loci rationale leads to uniform
treatment only to the extent that none of the possible interested forums has a
strong policy requiring a different result. The theory has also been criticized
for ignoring the interests of jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred.9
The recent attitude of New York reflects a rapidly growing and now acute
distrust of the rigid application of lex loci and a preference for a more flexible
approach centering on policy factors indicative of a "paramount interest" of one
state over another. °
With minor exceptions, New York 'adhered faithfully to lex loci until Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines," where the court made an effort to undermine that
doctrine without condemning it. The Kilberg court declined to apply the law
of the place of an airplane crash (Massachusetts) insofar as that law restricted
the amount of recovery by a New York resident whose trip began in New York.
Arguing that the crash in Massachusetts was "entirely fortuitous,' 2 the court
reasoned that New York's policy of unrestricted recovery predominated over the
Massachusetts statutory restriction on recovery. Although Kilberg made no mention of the terminology of "center of gravity" and made no explicit effort to
overrule lex loci, the court's weighing of contacts in the two competing states
signalled a readiness to abandon the rigidity of lex loci when the forum's citizen
would appear to be unjustly treated by a foreign law.
The Kilberg court was not required to take a definitive position on the lex
loci doctrine, for the issue of the applicability of the Massachusetts damage limitation was not even argued on appeal. The court deftly classed the measure of
damages as procedural in order to achieve its result "without doing violence to
the accepted pattern of conflict of laws rules."'" The court's willingness to brand
an issue procedural in order to promote the interests of its citizens indicated a
manipulation of the lex loci doctrine not in accord with the rule's objectives of
uniformity and predictability.1 ' In essence, the dominant rationale in Kilberg
appears to be that the recovery limitation of Massachusetts would not be enforced because it violated New York's strong public policy of unlimited recovery.
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals explicitly departed from the lex
loci doctrine in Babcock v. Jackson' s by holding that New York law rather than
that of Ontario would govern the liability of a New York driver for injuries
suffered by his New York guest riding in his New York car in Ontario. Noting
that both parties were citizens of the forum, that their trip was to begin and end
9 See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. Rav. 959, 976-77
(1952).
10 MacKendrick v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994, 1000,
302 N.Y.S.2d 124, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
11 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). For comments on Kilberg see
30 FORDHAm L. Rav. 170 (1961); 12 SYRAcusn L. Rlv. 395 (1961); 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rv.

670, 674 (1963); 15 VANm. L. Ray. 271 (1961).
12 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
135 (1961).

13 Id., 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
14 See id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
15 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). For comments on Babcock
see Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963); 32 FORHAm L. REv. 158 (1963); 77 H~Av. L. REv. 355
(1963); Note, 32 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 143 (1965).
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in New York, and that the car was licensed and garaged in that same state, the
court reasoned that such contacts gave New York "the superior claim for the
application of its law."'" In a sweeping broadside against the vested rights theory
underlying the lex loci doctrine, the court added that the rights and liabilities
of the parties stemming from their guest-host relationship "should remain constant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to place."'"
The Babcock analysis resembles what has been generally termed the "governmental interest" approach to choice of law.18 This approach recognizes that
each jurisdiction may have policies concerning the occurrence in question, but
that a jurisdiction ought not apply its law unless it has contacts with the occurrence that would cause its policies to be directly furthered. 9
Babcock explicitly rejects the vested rights theory at the core of the lex
loci doctrine. Furthermore, Babcock's rationale differs in at least two respects
from lex loci: first, it looks to more than the central "contact" of the injury in
determining the governing law; and second, it looks to more than one jurisdiction
to supply the governing law, thus admitting in principle that differing issues in
a case may be governed by differing laws of differing jurisdictions. The determination of the proper law is made under the principle of "dominant con'0
taCts.'
Although the end result in Babcock's fact pattern appears praiseworthy,
the rationale of "dominant contacts" remains an unexplored catchall. The
opinion gives little helpful advice for determining what contacts are "dominant"
or "significant" when a number of states have competing policy interests. In
its careful enumeration of the minute contacts of New York, the Babcock analysis
suggests that "dominance" and "significance" are disclosed by a quantitative
addition of contacts rather than by a qualitative appraisal of significantly differing contacts. Babcock leaves the impression not only that the car's New York
license is equally as significant as the parties' New York domiciliary status but
also that such quantitative tests will not solve the cases where true policy conflicts are at issue. The thinking in Babock blandly implies that the applicable
law is determined by the greater number of contacts. Quantitatively,
[a]s to [this] issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, and
where their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and

16 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751
(1963).
17 Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
18 See Gurrie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964
(1958). The court's comment is especially interesting:
"[T]he best practical result" . . . may best be achieved by giving controlling effect
to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in
the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place 'having the most
interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues . . ." and thereby
allows the forum to apply "the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned
with the outcome of [the] particular litigation.'" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
19 Currie, supra note 18, at 964 and ff.
20 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751
(1963).
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was to end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of
the accident, which has the dominant contacts ....21

Instead of defining such important but vague terms, the Babcock decision
goes on to invoke those otherwise laudable common-law ultimates: "justice,"
"fairness," and "the best practical result."2 With these "Delphic phrases,"2 3
Babcock added to the "conflict, crisis, and confusion in New York," 24 which to
25
some observers created a serious "crisis" in American conflict law.
Babcock's undermining of the lex loci doctrine was short-lived. In Dym
v. Gordon," where the plaintiff-resident of New York was injured while riding
in defendant-host's car in Colorado, the New York Court of Appeals applied
the Colorado statute denying recovery and dismissed the complaint. The reason
for seemingly retreating from Babcock in favor of the lex loci lay in the court's
feeling that the accident arose out of the "Colorado-based activity"2 " of two
New York students who met by chance and without plan in Colorado. Significantly, the Dym court refused the interpretation that Babcock suggested a
"rule of domicile" or a "public policy" rationale," preferring instead to limit
its protective rationale to the place where the contact arose29

Dym muddied the refreshing drift from the stagnancy of lex loci. Whereas
in Babcock the trip commenced and was to end in New York, in Dym the
parties met while taking the same golf course at the University of Colorado.

Their trip was entirely Colorado-originated and Colorado-based. Furthermore,
Dym determined that although the case involved a tort action, the disputed issue
of rights and liabilities was contractual in nature., Consistent with this rationale
the court concluded that the law of Colorado ought govern, since it was there
that the "contractual relationship" arose. The pivotal factor was the "seat"
21 Id., 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751. For critical analysis of the quantitative
approach see Comment, 62 MicH. L. Rv. 1358, 1372 (1964); Note, 20 RUTGERS L. Rv.
572, 578 (1966).
22 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279,,283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749

(1963).

23 For a strong criticism of the ambiguity of such phrases see Rosenberg, Two Views on
Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUm. L. Rav. 459, 460 (1967).
24 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 690 (1963). "The courts
are left with no satisfactory means of determining which contacts are more significant than
others, regardless of whether the courts adopt a quantitative approach." Comment, 62 MIcn.
L. REv. 1358, 1373 (1964). Following Babcock, Professors Cavers, Cheatham, Currie,
Ehrenzweig, Leflar, and Reese expressed their views on the case in Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 1212 (1963). Professor Cheatham gave great emphasis to the court's discussion of the concepts of center of gravity
and grouping of contacts. Id. at 1229. Professor Currie believed that the court adopted his
theory of governmental interest. Id. at 1234-35. Professor Ehrenzweig saw Babcock as an expression of his view that "the law of the state where the insured car is permanently kept"
should prevail. Id. at 1246. Professors Cavers, Leflar, and Reese were unable to find in the
opinion any means of agreeing with any of the above views.
25 Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Desperanto of
State "Interests," 68 COLUm. L. Rav. 49 (1968); B. CututE, supra note 24; Kegel, The
Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 AcAniEI DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 91268 (1964).
26 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
27 Id. at 121, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
28 Id. at 123, 209 N.E.2d 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
29 Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467. "Thus it is that in this case, where
Colorado has such significant contacts with the relationship itself and the basis of its formation,
the application of its law and underlying policy are clearly warranted." Id., 209 N.E.2d at
794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
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or "nexus" of the relationship, which was to be determined solely from neither
the physical situs nor from the place the contractual relationship arose, but
rather from these two factors plus the intent of the parties."
The difficulty in Dym appears most clearly in Judge Fuld's dissent:
The mere fact that the guest-host relationship between the New York
parties originated in Colorado has, in truth, as little relevance to the policy
underlying that state's guest statute... as did the fact, in Babcock, of the
occurrence of the accident in Ontario in relation to the similar policy
embodied in its guest statute.3 '
Judge Fuld's analysis leads him to the conclusion that Colorado's contacts were
numerically greater than Ontarios in Babcock but were still not significant to
the policy issue of protecting New York citizens from foreign law. 2
Suspended in a legal limbo between Babcock and Dym, the New York
courts nevertheless next manifested a willingness to expand lex fori protection
to noncitizens suing a New York defendant. In Long v. Pan American World
Airways," the court extended the Babcock rational of quantitative contacts to
the wrongful death of a nonresident. Defendant's airplane, en route from Puerto
Rico to Philadelphia, disintegrated and fell to the ground in Maryland. Decedents had resided in Pennsylvania where they had purchased their tickets
for the round-trip flight from Philadelphia to San Juan. Both Pennsylvania
and Maryland permitted recoveries for wrongful death, but the Maryland law,
more restrictive than that of Pennsylvania, created a. cause of action only for
the surviving spouse, parent, or child of the deceased. Since decedents had no
such survivors, Maryland law would preclude any recovery while Pennsylvania
law would permit considerable compensation.
Enumerating in near-statistical fashion the decedents' various contacts
with Pennsylvania and weighing these contacts against the one fatal contact
with Maryland, the New York Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania law
ought govern because that state had "the most significant relationship.""4 While
this result was seemingly the better alternative, the decision offered little clarification of the qualitative versus quantitative aspects of the contact theory.
In 1969, however, with Tooker v. Lopez," the Court of Appeals realized
an opportunity to resolve its admitted "inconsistencies."' 6 By a resolute majority
the court explicitly overruled Dym in holding that New York law, not that of
30 Id., 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
31 Id. at 131-32, 207 N.E.2d at 799, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (Fuld, J., dissenting). One
author makes the interesting suggestion that in Dym the site of the injury was not fortuitous,
the element ruling out fortuity being the dual facts that the relationship began in Colorado and
continued there for six months. Two other elements proving nonfortuity are a long time spent
in and intent to remain in the locus of jurisdiction.
In analyzing the fact situation involved in a litigation, if the court finds that the
place of the accident was any less than "entirely fortuitous," taking into consideration the factors underlying the fortuity concept . . . it should apply the lex loci
delicti. Comment, 15 BUFFALO L. Rav. 443, 451 (1966).
32 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 130-32, 207 N.E.2d 792, 797-99, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463,
470-72. (Fuld, J., dissenting).
33 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 513 (1965).
34 Id. at 343, 213 N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
35 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
36 Id. at 572, 249 N.E.2d at 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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Michigan, applied to the death of a New York guest in a New York-registered
car driven by its New York owner in Michigan. Tooker explicitly invoked
Babcock to justify its rejection of lex loci," and once again the court stated that
New York had "the only real interest" in the case. 8
Concurring with the majority, Judge Fuld explicated three guidelines illustrative of the replacement of lex loci:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in
the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should
control and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his
guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should
not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon
him under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely,
when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law
permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not
be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally,
the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident
occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normal applicable
rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing
the smooth working 39of the multi-state system or producing great unertainty for litigants.
With the rest of the Tooker court immersed in the insurance problems of
Babcock and Tooker, Judge Fuld's analysis of the rights of conflicting jurisdictions best presaged the argumentation in MacKendrick.
In MacKendrick, the court initially determined that Alco was an independent contractor because it had no contract with Newport."0 The more difficult question confronting the court, however, arose from the fact that the
MacKendrick fact pattern was only superficially similar to those of the preceding
cases. Decedent's misfortune occurred neither in an auto nor in a plane; furthermore, it did not occur at the immediate instrumentality of another designated
person. In effect, the court invoked three arguments to justify the replacement
of the lex loci of Virginia by the lexi fori of New York.
The court's first and seemingly frailest argument lies in an analogy to the
auto and plane fact patterns in the preceding cases. If decedent had been killed
in a New York auto on his way to work in Newport, "New York law would
surely apply."'L Similarly, the court reasoned that if decedent had been killed in
an air accident en route to Newport, "New York law would likewise surely
apply."42 Though decedent met death neither in a plane nor in an auto, the
court felt that the transition to the MacKendrick situation was "logical":
37 Id. at 571, 249 N.E.2d at 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
38 Id. at 576, 249 N.E.2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
39 Id. at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532-33.
40 MacKendrick v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994, 998,
302 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
41 Id. at 1010, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
42 Id.
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There is no logical reason to deny to the deceased and to his family,
New York domiciliaries, the protection and benefits of the New York law
because he happened to meet his death in an industrial accident after his
arrival in Newport News on a temporary work assignment from his home
office in New York. It would be a mockery and contrary to the intent
of the law to extend to him the protection afforded under New York law
as a traveler in an auto or airplane, and then divest
him of it the moment
43
he disembarks from said vehicle of transportation.
The difficulty, which the court does not dissipate, concerns the determination of the protected time period after arrival. Extending the protection of New
York law to "the moment he disembarks" is neither problematic nor illustrative
of the case. MacKendrick had not just disembarked; he had been living in a
motel in Newport News on a daily basis for a month prior to his death. The
court's discussion of the time element is most unhelpful, nor is it improved by
the passing assurance that "[w]hen he is divested of New York's protective
cloak would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."44
A second approach used in MacKendrick stems from the "center of gravity"
phraseology espoused in Babcock and Tooker." Perhaps feeling that the vagueness of one such phrase could be dissipated by joining it with others of the same
pattern, the court stated: "Since 'paramount interest,' 'center of gravity,' 'public
policy' and 'grouping of contacts' are now applied in auto and airplane torts,
as well as in contracts, contempt, property, and will cases . . . then why not

here [sic]." What this quantitative resort fails to determine is, once again, the
yardstick for measuring whose contacts are superior. The contacts with Virginia, to which defendant Newport appealed and which the court did not
discuss, could be made nearly as quantitative as those with New York. Indeed, Newport's argument was precisely that MacKendrick was living in a
Virginia motel, working in a Virginia plant with no connection to New York,
repairing material partially built and totally assembled in Virginia, and was
working in this fashion not just as of the moment he "disembarked" but for
over a month. While the court showed awareness of these facts, it made no
effort to weigh the competitive significance of these contacts over against those
of New York.
The problem with the "center of contacts" doctrine, as with all its analogues,
is that the contacts tend to be determined on the side of the aggrieved party in
isolation from the contacts on the part of the other party. Newport's abortive due
process complaint is precisely on this point, but the court shrinks from discussing it:

Does this court thereby unlawfully deprive defendant the protection
of its own laws? Is there a denial to defendant of due process and equal
protection, which would do violence to the traditional and fundamental
concepts of justice? The court's answer is in the negative.
On the contrary, to deny plaintiff the protection of the laws of the
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1009-10, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
Id. at 1010, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
Id. at 996, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
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State of New York, under all the facts and circumstances herein, would
indeed be a gross miscarriage of justice and do violence to the principles
of fair play.48
The third argument espoused in the MacKendrick decision, public policy,49
undoubtedly transcends in simplicity the weakness of the preceding two. In
effect, the New York courts have gone beyond Babcock, Long, and Tooker in
now openly justifying the "paternalistic" policy of protecting New York doniciliaries. 0 In the court's own words: "Clearly, the public policy of our courts is
to protect New York domiciliaries, wherever possible, from denial of recovery in
another jurisdiction, and Dym v. Gordon [citation] was interred for all time
and for all purposes." 51
While this argument has its obvious paternal merits, it needs to be supported with some defense of the public policy of being "paternalistic" toward
one party in a lawsuit. Indeed, the paternalism in MacKendrick repeatedly
appears in the court's constant references to the "justice" of MacKendrick's
complaint and the "injustice" of denying it.2
Significant in MacKendrick and its predecessors is the explicit use of the
concepts of "paramount interest," "center of gravity," and "grouping of contacts.""5 In his vigorous dissent in Babcock, Judge Van Voorhis argued that
such expressions are "catchwords" incapable of a definitional task, "inadequate to
define a principle of law," and inapplicable "in the realm of torts."5"
Much discussion has rightfully been directed at these concepts for their
vagueness. One obvious reason for such vagueness is that the New York courts
are forging a new beginning in conflict-of-law theory, and their operative terms
have not yet had the benefit of tradition's penchant for increasing precision. 5
Still the problem remains. Whether a particular "contact" is significant is
meaningless until significance is judged in terms of -the policies and interests of
the parties and states involved. Obviously, when there is no conflict, the law of
the only interested state would be applied. When there is a conflict, the more
significant "contacts" ought indicate which state has the "dominant" interest.
Yet the decisions in Babcock, Long, Tooker, and MacKendrick repeatedly fail
to get beyond a fruitless enumeration of the individual contacts or a self-conscious
flirting with paternalism. Quantitative lists of contacts are no substitute for a
policy yardstick of "significance." Until that yardstick is found, the New York
courts may be able to achieve "just" results for its own citizens via a paternalistic
policy decree, without, however, being able to answer defendant's charge that
the court is thereby denying due process or at least being unresponsive, as in
MacKendrick, to plaintiff's contacts with defendant's own state.
Rudolph 1. Gerber
48 Id. at 1011, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41.
49 Id., 302 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1000, 1002, 1011, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 132, 140.
53 Id. at 1010, 302 N.Y.S.2d 139.
54 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 486, 191 N.E.2d 279, 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 753
(1963) (dissenting opinion).
55 Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rav. 1212, 1231 (1963).
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JURY TRIAL ATTACHES TO THOSE ISSUES IN STOCKHOLDER'S DERVATIVE
ACTIONS AS TO WHICH THE CORPORATION, HAD IT BEEN SUING IN ITS OWN
RIGHT, WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL. Corporate: stock-

holders of the Lehman Corporation, a dosed-end investment company,
brought suit in federal court against Lehman's directors and the corporation's brokers, Lehman Brothers. The stockholders charged the directors with
converting corporate assets and of "gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct,
willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence," and breach of fiduciary duty.
Lehman Brothers was also accused of breach of fiduciary duty. The stockholders contended that the defendants were using an illegally large representation on the corporation's board of directors to extract excessive brokerage fees
from the investment company in favor of the brokerage firm; and they demanded
that defendants "account for and pay to the corporation for their profits and
gains and its losses." In addition, the stockholders demanded a jury trial on the
corporation's claims. The defendant's motion to strike the jury trial demand
was denied by the district court.' To expedite the "ultimate termination to
[the] litigation," the district court permitted an interlocutory appeal on the jury
trial question. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a stockholder's derivative action is entirely equitable in
nature and must be tried to the court.' Certiorari was sought and granted, and
the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held: In
a stockholder's derivative action the right to a jury trial preserved by the seventh
amendment "attaches to those issues as to which the corporation, had it been
suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury." Ross u. Bernhard,

90 S.Ct. 733 (1970).
At common law the minority stockholder was without legal remedy when

his corporation failed or refused to take appropriate action for its own protection. Concerned with the inadequate remedial avenues open to the abused
stockholder, courts of equity fashioned and developed the stockholder's derivative
action as "a corrective for managerial abuse."' Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co.'

represents the first classic application of the stockholder's derivative action in
American courts. In that case the court depicted the relationship between shareholders and directors as analogous to that of beneficiaries and their trustees,

held that a breach of this trust relationship by directors vested equitable litigable
rights in the shareholder, and accordingly permitted a shareholder suit brought

to compel directors to restore corporate assets.
While early cases, following Taylor's lead, limited the right of the shareholder to recovery from officers and directors within the corporation, later cases.
extended this right to allow shareholders to recover from outsiders who had
wronged the corporation.' The theoretical basis of the derivative action resulted
1 Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 '(S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), rev'd, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
2 Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
3 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. RMv.
980, 994 (1957).
4 5 Ohio 162, 22 Am. Dec. 785 (1831).
5 This progression is discussed in Prunty, supra note 3, at 985-92.
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from the fusion of two equitable remedies. The stockholder's complaint rested
on a breach of trust by directors to the shareholders. His standing'to sue stemmed
from the representative nature of his claim." This evolution of the derivative
suit in the equity side of the courts has been determinative of its treatment as a
nonjury action.
The rationale underlying the judiciary's penchant for characterizing the
derivative suit as equitable in nature is found deep in the bowels of Amiericafi

legal history.
The seventh amendment provides for trial by jury in suits at common law
where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.' Traditionally the courts
have used a historical test to determine the right to a jury trial: Would the
action have been cognizable in a court of law at the time of the adoption of the
seventh amendment?' Although the shareholder's derivative action had 'not
yet matured when the seventh amendment was adopted and hence cannot be
categorized as either legal or equitable by resort to the traditional test,9 every preRoss court save one' had held that being a creature of equity, the stockholder
derivative suit could only be asserted in a court of equity.'"
Partiality to this line of thought has not been confined to the federal
judiciary. Judicial treatment of the derivative action in states having a constitutional" and procedural framework similar to the federal system has led to
the same results.'" Treatise writers have agreed with judicial treatment of the
6 Id. at 992.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides in pertinent part that: "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ..
8 "The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English
common law when the Amendment was adopted." Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,
295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). For additional examples of the great favor shown this test by
the Supreme Court, see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Thomson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 '(1897).
9 See notes 49-52 infra and accompanying text.
10 The maverick case was DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F. 2d 826 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). The De Pinto decision set up the conflict be-

tween the circuits that led to the Supreme Court's decision in Ross.
11 In Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court did not
follow DePinto, opting instead for the traditional view: "A derivative action could never
be brought as a 'suit at common law.' Even though it asserts what would be legal claims
if asserted by the corporation, it has always been exclusively in equity." In a parallel vein,
the district court in Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946) noted:
A stockholder's derivative suit is an invention of the courts of equity and is
recognizable only in equity and cannot be maintained at law. . . . Even if the
claim, if sued directly by the corporation, would be an action at law, yet, if enforced by means of a stockholder's derivative suit, it is prosecuted by an action in
equity.
Accord, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947); Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167
(1946).
12 The seventh amendment is inapplicable to the states. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R.
v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 213 (1916)
However most state constitutions have a provision similar to the seventh amendment. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions,
72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
13 Metcalf v. Shamel, 166 Cal. App. 2d 789, 333 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Morton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 P. 1014 (1925); Rettinger v. Pierpont,
145 Neb. 161, 15 N.W.2d 393 (1944); Steinway v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, 273 P.2d 872
(Okla. 1954); McAleer v. Dawson, 119 Okla. 273, 248 P. 615 (1925); Isaac v. Marcus,
258 N.Y. 257, 179 N.E. 487 (1932); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 105 N.Y. 567, 12 N.E. 58
(1887); Goetz v. Mfrs. Traders' Trust Co., 154 Misc. 733, 277 N.Y.S. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
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derivative action in holding it is a nonjury action.14
Against this formidable precedent, a divided Supreme Court held in Ross
v. Bernhard that a stockholder's derivative action is triable to a jury if the claim
that the corporation was entitled to assert would have been triable to a jury.
In ruling as it did, the majority performed a two-step procedure in logic. The
Court first analyzed the derivative action as consisting of two parts, the stockholder's standing to sue and the corporation's underlying claim against the
wrongdoer. 5 The Court then applied this duality to the doctrine enunciated in
Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 6 and Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood 7 that when
there are legal and equitable claims in a single action, the legal issues are triable
to a jury before final determination of the equitable issues to the court. The
dissent followed the traditional approach, holding that since the derivative
action was born in equity it did not command a jury trial."
In recognizing the dual nature of the derivative suit, the majority was by no
means breaking new ground. Indeed, as early as 1882'" the Supreme Court
had conceptually labeled the derivative action as combining two parts: "[the]
one against his [the shareholder's] own company, of which he is a corporator,
for refusing to do what he has requested them to do; and the other against the
party which contests the matter in controversy with that corporation."2 Subsequent cases have recognized and accepted the dual nature of the derivative
action 2' while emphasizing the primary nature of the corporation's claim.22
Neff v. Barber, 165 Wis. 503, 162 N.W. 667 (1917); Harrington v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127,
99 N.W. 909 (1904).
14
A derivative action is an invention of the courts of equity and may be brought
only in equity whether the corporate cause of action be in law or not. As far as
corporate rights and defenses available against it are in issue, these issues are decided
exactly as if the corporation were the plaintiff except the matter of jury trial for the
case being in equity there is no right to jury trial. N. LATTIN, THE LAw OF CoRPoATrIoNs 350 (1959). See 4 W. CooK, CORPORATIONS § 734, at 3186-87 (1923); 13 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5931, at 402 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1961); 5 J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 38.38[4], at 306 (1969).
15 "Thus the dual nature of the stockholders' action: first the plaintiff's right to sue
on behalf of the corporation and second the merits of the corporation claim itself." Ross
v. Bernhard, 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 (1970).
16 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
17 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
18 Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S.Ct. 733, 742 (1970) (Mr. Justice Stewart dissenting).
19 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
20 Id. at 452-53.
21 See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
The dual nature of the action has not escaped the commentators. Ballantine refers to
the stockholder's derivative action as combining two claims: "(1) to enforce in equity the
corporate duty to the shareholder and (2) to enforce in the same proceedings the basic or
underlying corporate right of action." H. BALLANTINE, CORPORArIONS § 151, at 359 (rev. ed.
1946). In another section he notes that the derivative action has been characterized by courts
as "in effect a combination of two causes of action, a proceeding having a dual nature."
Id. § 145, at 343.
Fletcher is in agreement with Ballantine, noting that
the stockholder's suit . . . is a suit having a double aspect. The stockholders have
a right in equity to compel the assertion of a corporate right of action against the
directors or other wrongdoers when the corporation wrongfully refuses to sue. 13 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5941.1, at 414 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1961).
22
The remedy sought is for wrong done to the corporation; the primary cause
of action belongs to the corporation; recovery must enure to the benefit of the corporation. The stockholder brings the action in behalf of others similarly situated to
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The stockholder is allowed to sue to protect the corporation only after it has
refused to assert its claim. He sues in a representative capacity, the primary
cause of action belonging to the corporation. It is the real party in interest and
the remedy inures to its benefit.2
Once this duality is recognized, it is obvious that the underlying corporate
claim against the wrongdoers might be equitable or legal in nature. If the
underlying corporate claim would be cognizable at common law were the corporation suing alone, the question arises why courts have denied jury trials in
such instances. This query demands an analysis of the procedural devices
through which claims were drawn into court.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal
judicial system administered two sets of procedures. Claims cognizable at common law were triable to a jury in a law court, while traditionally equitable
claims were decided in a court of equity without a jury. The boundary marking
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity was not always clear.
In general, actions for money damages were cognizable at common law. Accordingly, claims seeking damages for personal injuries, breach of contract, libel,
or slander, for example were traditionally legal,24 while bills seeking injunctiv6
relief, specific performance, or restitution were considered equitable in nature-2
In some instances a claim for equitable relief would contain incidental legal
issues. In other situations, a legal remedy would become available to resolve a
claim subsequent to equity's jurisdiction over the suit. To avoid confusion,
delay, and injustice, it was a well established principle that once a court of
equity had jurisdiction over a suit it would retain jurisdiction for all purposes,
disposing of all the litigation in the case even if that involved a determination
of legal issues and the granting of legal remedies." Thus, in certain cases, under
this "clean-up" power an equity court would dispose of legal issues.
In general, the nature of the remedy sought was determinative of the right
of jury trial. 7 In some instances, however, the separation of law and equity itself
28
determined the rights of parties. In Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Ca.,
vindicate the corporate rights, and a judgment on the merits is a binding adjudication of those rights. Isaacs v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932).

23

The cause of action which [the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit]
brings before the court is not his own but that of the corporation's. It is the real
party in interest and he is allowed to act in protection of its interest somewhat
as a "next of friend" might do for an individual, because it is disabled from protecting itself. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947).
In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court noted:
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder who had no standing to bring
civil action at law against faithless directors. Equity . . . allowed him to step
into the corporation's shoes and seek in its right the restitution he could not demand on his own. It required him first to demand that the corporation vindicate
its own rights but when as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrong also were
able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and adjudge the corporation's cause
through its shareholders with the corporation as a defendant, albeit a rather nominal
one. Id. at 548.

24 2B W.

BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PR. CTICE AND PROCEDURE § 872, at 25-26
(rev. ed. C. Wright 1961).
25 Id. at 21-24.
26 See generally 1. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JUsPRuDENcE §§ 181-82, at 257-61, § 237, at
429-31 '(5th ed. S. Simons 1941).
27 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 872, at 21-26
(rev. ed. C. Wright 1961)

28

240 U.S. 27 (1916).
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for example, stockholders sued derivatively in a court of equity for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Court recognized that the underlying claim
set up by the plea for treble damages was "that of the corporation alone,"
and as such was a legal claim entitling the defendants to a jury trial on the
question of penal damages. This conclusion, however, was fatal to the stockholders' action in that case. The court of equity could not conduct a jury trial
on the corporation's underlying antitrust claim, and hence the derivative action
was dismissed by the court. In Fleitmann, procedural impediments resulting
from separate law and equity courts thus worked to deny trial on the legal
claim to a jury.
The anomaly of this situation is obvious. If the defendant was sued by the
corporation, he was entitled to a jury trial; but when sued derivatively under the
corporation's claim, he either lost his right to a jury trial entirely, or by insisting
on it he defeated the action.2"
The merger of law and equity in 1938 facilitated the creation of more
complex and sophisticated actions than had previously existed. The Federal
Rules of Procedure"0 permitted the blending of legal and equitable claims 1
into one "civil action," 2 as where equitable and legal issues were joined, a
legal counterclaim was interposed in an equitable action, or an equitable defense or counterclaim was interposed in a legal action. 3 In this "civil action"
equitable issues would be decided by the court and legal issues would be determined by a jury. Because these more complex actions had no precise analogue
in 1791, the seventh amendment historical test has been difficult to apply under
the streamlined procedure of the federal rules.3 4
One dilemma confronting the courts has arisen where a common factual
issue embodied both a legal and an equitable claim. Thus, A sues B in equity
for an injunction preventing B from bringing an antitrust action against him.
B counterclaims at law for the antitrust violation. Both A's equitable claim and
B's legal claim stem from the same factual controversy.
Applying pre-merger concepts to this hypothetical, A's legal issue would
be decided without a jury under the clean-up power of the equity court. The
operation of this procedure would thus deny B's right to a jury trial on the legal
issue. But under the merged system of rules, legal and equitable issues could
be joined in the same action and tried side by side. The sequence of trial order
29 See Brief for Appellant at 10, Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preserved intact the constitutional right to
trial by jury. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate." FED. R. Crv. P. 38(a). It should be understood that this Comment deals with
the constitutional right to trial by jury on the corporation's claim in derivative suits. Though
there is no statute giving such a right in antitrust cases, the demand for treble damages, by
its penal nature, has been construed as conferring a statutory right. Fleitmann v. Welsbach
St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 '(1916).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) in pertinent part provides that:
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and
the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both
as he may have against an opposing party.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as a 'civil action."'
33 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE %38.07[1], at 39 (2d ed. 1969).
34 2B W. BARROrN & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 872, at 20 (rev.
ed. C. Wright 1961).
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thus became important since prior disposition of the equitable claim might collaterally estop jury determination of the legal issue. 5 Several tests were devised
to resolve this problem. Some courts applied the traditional clean-up rule that
legal issues would be determined subsequent to equitable issues."

Other courts

held the sequence of issue determination was a matter for the judge's discretion."
A third test looked to the basic nature of the entire issue." Other courts ruled
that legal issues must be tried before equitable issues."
In 1959 the Supreme Court ended this controversy, strongly reaffirming
that all legal issues are jury actions and cannot be denied a jury hearing by the
manner in which they come into court.40 To the above factual pattern, the
Beacon Theatres Court held that where both a legal and an equitable issue
spring from the same controversy, the legal issue is entitled to jury determination prior to a ruling by the court on the equitable claim. In Beacon the Court
noted that the federal rules neither enlarged nor abridged seventh amendment
rights."' However the Court also noted that the federal rules introduced procedural remedies that, had they existed under the pre-merger system, would
have made the dean-up doctrine unnecessary. To the extent that these reforms
35 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505 (1959).
36 E.g., North Am. Philips Co. v. Brownshield, 9 F.R.D. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Bendix
Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1948); U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co. v.
Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Mather v. Ford Motor Co., 40 F. Supp. 589 "(E.D.
Mich. 1941); Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 713 (D.N.J. 1941); Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The district courts applying
this test had handsome pre-merger Supreme Court precedent to draw from. See American
Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank,
260 U.S. 235 (1922).
37 FED. R. Cirv. P. 42(b) as it read prior to Beacon provided that:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, thirdparty claims, or issues.
This trend has been manifested in decisions dealing with the joinder of legal and
equitable claims. See Tanimura v. United States, 191 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951); Russel v.
Laurel Music Corp., 104 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) '(dictum). Counterclaims or crossclaims, have given rise to similar holdings. See Black v. Boyd, 251 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.
1958); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 745
(1943); Institutional Drug Distribs., Inc. v. Yankwich, 249 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1957)

(dictum).

38 Under this test, if the issues are found to be basically equitable the equitable claim
is tried prior to the legal claim. Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d
563 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1939) ;
Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 713 "(D.N.J. 1941). If the issues appear
basically legal, then the legal claim is determined prior to the equitable claim. Ring v. Spina,
166 F.2d 546 (2nd Cir. 1948); United States Process Corp. v. Fort Pitt Brewing Co., 29
F. Supp. 37 (W.D. Pa. 1939). See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.16, at 148-58
(2d ed. 1969); Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 289, 290-91 nn.10&11 (1960).
39 The basis for this test is FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). The text of this provision is set
forth in note 30 supra. See Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1946):
We regard the rules enlarging the powers of the single tribunal to hear
and determine equitable and legal transactions in which the pre-existing right to
jury trial is to be preserved, as a long forward step in our judicial procedure. We
consider one of its major purposes is to remove the expensive and time-losing
requirement of two separate suits to give to the litigant his jury as well as his
equitable relief. We are not in accord with the extreme judicial conservatism
which instinctively clings to out-moded intricate processes and would seek to nullify
or minimize every attempt for their simplification.
See also Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 289, 290 n.13 (1960).
40 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
41 See id. at 508-09.
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corrected previous procedural obstacles to jury trials, the scope of equity was
reduced:
Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when legal remedies were inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal remedies provided
by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of equity. Thus, the justification for equity's deciding legal
issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely
because subsequently a legal remedy becomes available, must be reevaluated in the light of the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules
which allow legal and equitable causes to be brought and resolved in one
civil action. 42 (Footnotes omitted.)
Three years later, in Dairy Queen,43 the Supreme Court reemphasized its
holding in Beacon Theatres. The complaint in question alleged that the defendant was infringing the plaintiff's trademark and had breached a licensing
agreement between the parties; it sought an injunction and an accounting. These
were traditionally equitable remedies (much as the stockholder's derivative
action was traditionally equitable). The Court held that since money damages
were sought, the right to a jury trial was not destroyed:
The holding in Beacon Theatres was that where both legal and equitable
issues are presented in a single case, "only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the
Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." That
holding, of course, applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize
the legal issues presented as "incidental" to equitable issues or not. Consequently, in a case such as this where there cannot even be a contention of
such "imperative circumstances," Beacon Theatres requires that any legal
issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury." (Footnotes omitted.)
Beacon and Dairy Queen modified the historical test governing the right
to a jury trial. The new test enunciated in these cases is whether an action
would have been triable as a common-law suit in 1791 had certain procedural
impediments then existing been corrected. In pre-merger Fleitmann, the derivative action for antitrust damages was dismissed because equity could not conduct a jury trial. Under the merged system, however, the trial of legal and
equitable issues side by side has led to a different result. In Fanchon & Marco,
Inc. v Paramount Pictures,45 the Second Circuit noted the absence of procedural
obstacles under the federal rules and allowed recovery on a stockholder's
derivative action for antitrust damages saying:
The Fleitmann case does hold specifically that a party is entitled to a
verdict of a jury against him before he can be forced to pay trebel damages . . . . This perfectly reasonable view of the policy of the statutory
remedy can be enforced without any difficulty in the merged procedure
42 Id. at 509.

43 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
44 Id. at 472-73.
45 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
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of the present rules. The two major issues of right of the shareholders
to sue and of violation of anti-trust laws .causing damage to the corporation can be tried side by side or otherwise as may be convenient; that
one may go to the jury while the other does not causes no difficulty."
Beacon and Dairy Queen thus symbolize two propositions. When legal and
equitable issues arise from the same factual dispute, the legal issue remains a
jury action and must be resolved prior to the equitable action. The second
proposition is that the traditional test governing the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial has been modified. The merged procedure of the federal rules
is now projected into a historical reference: Would the substantive action have
been a jury action at common law in 1791 were procedural remedies effectuated
by the federal rules available in that period?
The Ross court applied this test to the stockholder's derivative action.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice White noted the dual aspect of the derivative suit; "first, the plaintiff's right to sue on behalf of the corporation and
second the merits of the corporation claim itself."'47 Connecting Beacon with this
analysis, he arrived at the proposition that when there are two issues, one legal
and the other equitable, the legal issue is entitled to jury determination.
The Court reasoned that historically the corporation's claim was tied to
the shareholder's equitable right to sue. The legal issue thus followed the shareholder's claim into a court of equity where it would be disposed of by the court
under equity's clean-up power. Such procedure denied any exercise of the right
to jury trial. The majority then looked to the procedural reforms ushered in
by the federal rules allowing legal and equitable issues to be tried side by side,
the one to the jury, the other to the court. Mr. Justice White noted that by
virtue of the federal rules "[p]urely procedural impediments to the presentation
of any issue by 48any party, based on the difference between law and equity,
were destroyed.3
The dissent objected to the projecting of the merged procedures into the
historical conditions prevailing at the time the seventh amendment was adopted.-"
46
47
48

49

Id. at 735.
Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1970).
Id. at 739. Mr. Justice White later observed:
The historical rule preventing a court of law from entertaining a shareholder's
suit on behalf of the corporation is obsolete; it is no longer tenable for a district
court, administering both law and equity in the same action, to deny legal remedies
to a corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders
rather than its directors. Under the rules, law and equity are procedurally combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by
which the parties happen to come before the court. The "expansion of adequate
legal remedies provided by * * * the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope
of equity." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S., at 509, 79 S.Ct., at
956. Id.
Said Mr. justice Stewart in the dissent:
The Seventh Amendment, by its terms, does not extend, but merely preserves
the right to a jury trial "in suits at common law." All agree that this means the
reach of the Amendment is limited to those actions which were tried to the jury
in 1791 when the Amendment was adopted. Suits in equity, which were historically tried to the court, were therefore unaffected by it. Similarly, Rule 38
of the Federal Rules has no bearing on the right to a jury trial in suits in equity,
for it simply preserves inviolate "the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment." Thus this Rule, like the Amendment itself, neither restricts nor
enlarges the right to jury trial. Indeed nothing in the Federal Rules can rightly
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Mr. Justice Stewart applied a static historic test: Would the shareholders have
been entitled to a jury trial on the corporate claim in 1791? This test, in effect,
isolates and then freezes the right to a jury absolutely as it was in 1791, and for
that reason lends itself to criticism. First, the derivative action was still in its
formative stage when the seventh amendment was adopted" - shareholders
rights had not yet been crystalized; in fact they were still expanding. Second,
the line between law and equity was never fixed or static."' Rather, it was continually shifting while each jurisdiction borrowed from the other; and there was
a considerable overlap of facts that could have been presented and decided at
both equity and law. This has led one critic to suggest that "the historic test...
is probably not well-adapted to the merged or united procedures of the present
day," because it does not accommodate for the extensions or contractions of
jury trial prior to 1791."' Fanchon & Marco, Beacon, and Dairy Queen confirm this notion and suggest a more flexible test. Whether it is said that these
cases "enlarge" or "preserve" the right to trial by jury, they do allow jury trials
in situations where they had been denied prior to the federal rules.
Ross finds its strength in this line of cases. Furthermore, the Court analogized the stockholder's derivative action to recent developments in other traditionally equitable actions. The Court noted that class actions, interpleader
actions, and intervener actions have all been traditionally equitable.5 3 In these
actions, issues that may have been jury submissible have been traditionally tried
to the court because the parties came into court through equity. Recent judicial
treatment of these actions, however, illustrates that jury trials are being more
liberally granted to the legal issues in those actions. The majority opinion lends
much weight to the continuation of this trend.
Ross v. Bernhard is a logical extension of Beacon and Dairy Queen. It is
meritorious on several grounds. It emphatically reaffirms the proposition that
the right to a jury trial depends solely on the substance of the issue in question
not upon the procedure under which the issue finds its way into court. Under
pre-merger concepts, if the defendants were sued by the corporation alone, they
would have been entitled to a jury trial, but where sued derivatively, they were
"cheated" of a jury trial. Ross resolves this anomaly. It restores to the parties

50
51
52
53

be construed to enlarge the right of jury trial, for in the legislation authorizing
the Rules, Congress expressly provided that they "shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant." 48 Stat. 1064. See 28 U.S.C. §
2072. I take this plain, simple, and straightforward language to mean that after
the promulgation of the Federal Rules, as before, the constitutional right to a jury
trial attaches only to suits at common law. So, apparently, has every federal court
that has discussed the issue. Since, as the Court concedes, a shareholder's derivative
suit could be brought only in equity, it would seem to me to follow by the most
elementary logic that in such suits there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Today the Court tosses aside history, logic and over 100 years of firm precedent
to hold that the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit does indeed have a
constitutional right to a trial by jury. This holding has a questionable basis in
policy and no basis whatever in the Constitution.
. . . If the corporation would have been entitled to a jury trial on such a
claim, then it is said, so is the shareholder. This conceptualization is without
any historical basis. Id. at 741-42.
See Prunty, supra note 3, at 980-92.
James, Right to a jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L. J. 655, 657-59 (1963).
Id. at 657, 664.
Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733, 739-40 (1970).
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in a stockholder's derivative suit "the same right to a jury trialwhich historically
belonged to the corporation and to those against whom the corporation pressed
54
its legal claims."
If any criticism could be levelled at the holding in Ross, it would likely be
founded on the practical consideration that the many complex and highly
technical issues arising in such suits which, until Ross, were tried to the court,
have now become subject to the whim of a relatively unsophisticated group of
laymen. Thus, continues the argument, "correct" decisions in derivative suits
may be harder to come by after Ross. In answer, it may be observed that this
line of thinking possibly gives more credit to the judiciary and less to the jury
than is warranted. Moreover, through rule 53 a court has the power to appoint
a master to assist the jury when exceptional conditions arise.55
J. Robert McMenamin
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Longridge Estates

developed hillside property in Los Angeles County into a tract of residential
lots which it then offered for sale. D. S. Hammer did the general engineering,
and the Donald R. Warren Company performed the soils engineering for the
tract. In early 1960, a lot in the tract was purchased and a house built thereon.
On June 15, 1960, Thomas and Carol Ann Avner purchased the lot and house
from the original buyer, their predecessor in interest. In February, 1962, a
portion of the rear slope of the lot failed.1 Again in November, 1965, the rear
slope of the lot failed in a different location. These slides were allegedly caused
by inadequate drainage and improper compaction of fill on the rear slope. Also,
the house itself was damaged when the entire lot pad settled because of insufficient compaction and decomposition of organic matter used as fill.
On July 1, 1960, the Avners filed their complaint in the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County against defendants Longridge Estates, D. S. Hammer, and
Donald R. Warren Company to recover damages for the defective construction
in the mass-production and sale of the lots. This complaint was, in part, based
on the doctrine of strict liability in tort. The trial court sustained the defendants'
demurrers, holding that there was no doctrine of strict liability as to the manufacture of residential lots. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, reversed and held: the manufacturer of a lot may be held strictly liable
in tort for damages suffered by the owner as a proximate result of any defects
in the lot. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (Ct. App. 1969).
The origin of modem products liability theory can be traced to the land54

Id. at 740.

55 FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
1 The damages resulting from this failure were not included in the plaintiff's cause of
action as they were admittedly barred by California's three-year period of limitations. CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 338 (2)

(West 1954).
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mark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' In that case, Judge Cardozo
sustained a cause of action in negligence on behalf of an ultimate consumer
injured by a defectively produced automobile. An action was allowed against
the manufacturer, Buick Motors, despite the absence of a buyer-seller privity
relationship. The issue, of course, was whether the manufacturer owed a duty
of care, sufficient to support a negligence action, to anyone but the original
purchaser. Following MacPherson, an orderly progression began in the field of
products liability with the imposition of liability for harm caused by defective
food s and products intended for bodily use.' The second landmark decision in
the area of products liability, Henningsen. v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,5 was
handed down in 1960 by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Chrysler Corporation
manufactured an automobile, and its authorized dealer, Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., sold it to the consumer, Mr. Henningsen. While Mrs. Henningsen was
driving, the steering mechanism failed without explanation, and the car veered
sharply to the right into a wall. Mrs. Henningsen brought an action against
both the manufacturer and the dealer. Both Chrysler and Bloomfield were held
liable, without any showing of negligence or privity, for the personal injuries
sustained by Mrs. Henningsen on the theory that an implied warranty of
merchantability guaranteed the automobile fit for its general purpose.8 Thus,
MacPherson destroyed the privity requirement in an action for negligence, and
Henningsen solidly established the doctrine of the implied warranty liability of a
manufacturer for a defect in its product which renders it unsafe for its intended purpose.7
Therefore, in order to hold manufacturers liable, the courts utilized these
first two traditional products liability theories of negligence and implied warranties. The doctrine of strict liability in tort had yet to be developed to overcome these more involved and cumbersome approaches. Then, in 1963, the
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' came before the California
Supreme Court. The plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood flew loose
from a defective power tool that his wife had purchased. He brought his action
against the manufacturer, Yuba Power Products, Inc., who defended on the
ground that notice of breach of warranty had not been given as required by the
Uniform Sales Act.' Justice Traynor discarded the warranty and the notice
requirement and clearly took the approach of strict liability in tort when he
stated:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.:1
2 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 E.g., Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
4 E.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
5 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
6 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d 84.
7 For the most authoritative and complete study of this development, see Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. R~v. 791 (1966).
8 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
9 CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE § 1769 (West 1954).
10 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700,
377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963).
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A unanimous California Supreme Court reiterated and strengthened the position it had taken in Greenman when it handed down Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co." It followed the precedent relative to manufacturers and extended
the strict liability theory to retailers. Today in California, the law is established
that in an action based on strict liability the issue is simply whether the product
was defective and whether such defect was the proximate cause of the injury 2
As expressed by one authority:
.Mhe California Supreme Court has placed the law of defective products on a new highway. It is one which is unfamiliar, true, but one which
is free from the twists and turns of the old and rejected warranty and
negligence concepts, and one which can be traveled with much greater
assurance and in a much straighter direction toward the desired goal of
proper imposition of liability for defective and dangerous chattels.' 3
In Avner, to accomplish the most far-reaching extension of strict liability
yet, the court had to establish a theory that would permit the plaintiff to recover for property damages' 4 caused by a construction contractor's defective
manufacture of real estate lots. Previously, the remedy was used against an
industrial manufacturer, but further development was obviously the trend. 5
In order to hold developers of lots within the strict liability doctrine, Avner relied
heavily upon the recent decision of Kriegler v. Eichler Homes" handed down
by its sister tribunal, the Court of Appeal for the Frrst District. Eichler Homes,
Inc., was a mass producer of homes in the Palo Alto area. These homes were
equipped with steel tubing radiant heating systems.' One such house, originally
purchased from defendant Eichler, was resold to the plaintiff. In November of
1959, the radiant heating system in the Kriegler home failed as a result of corrosion of the steel tubing. The plaintiff brought an. action against Eichler for
damages sustained due to the breakdown, based on strict liability in tort.
The Kriegler court was immediately willing to apply strict liability in tort as
11
12

61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).

This California position was adopted by the RESTATEMENT

(1965):

(SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
13 Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and past Vander.
mark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 45 (1965).
14 It is established law in California that the doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to
harm to property. Ghenna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 649, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94,
101 (Ct. App. 1966). 15 As mentioned, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391
P.2d 168 (1964) imposed liability on retailers to spearhead this trend.
16 269 Cal. App. 2d -,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969).
17 Arro Company, a subcontractor of Eichler Homes, Inc., had purchased the steel tubing
from General Motors and had done the actual installation of the system in the Kriegler Home.
Eichler cross-complained against Arro and General Motors, but the court denied recovery. Id.
at

-

74 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
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set forth by Greenman and Vandermark; the plaintiff had only to show that while
using the instrument as intended he was injured as a proximate result of the
defect in it. Previously, the doctrine had been applied only to manufacturers,
retailers, and suppliers of personal property. Its application in the sale of real
estate had been rejected earlier in Conolley v. Bull. In order to impose strict
liability upon construction contractors, therefore, Kriegler overlooked Conolley
and directed its attention to the second New Jersey landmark in the field of
strict liability, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc." The facts in Schipper were
very similar to those in Kriegler.2 ° Levitt, a mass-producer of homes, built and
sold a house which the plaintiff subsequently leased from defendant's vendee.
Plaintiff's minor son was injured by excessively hot water drawn from the house's
heater. The defendant had failed to place on the heater a mixing valve which
would regulate the temperature of the water. Plaintiff sued for injuries suffered as a result of the defective condition of the heater.
To sustain recovery, Schipper reviewed Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., where the New Jersey Supreme Court had stated: "We see no rational
doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a
defective automobile."'" The same court which, in Henningsen, had been willing
to extend liability to other products did not hesitate in Schipper to move ahead
again, this time in the construction field:
Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to
discredit the law should be readily rejected as they were step by step in
Henningsen . . . . We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions
between Levitt's mass production and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same. That being so the warranty or strict liability
principles of Henningsen . . . should be carried over into the realty field
.... 22 (Emphasis added.)
In California, Kriegler reached this same conclusion by paraphrasing the
words of the New Jersey court: "there are no meaningful distinctions between
Eichler's mass production and sale of homes and the mass production
and sale of automobiles .... ,,2'Both Schipper and Kriegler heavily
relied on the fact that the defendants were mass-producers dealing in
a very large volume. The question was one of size, where both courts
could easily equate construction contractors with large-scale manufacturers.
The buyer relied on the work of the contractor just as the consumer relies on
the manufacturer's product. Avner accepted the Schipper doctrine and readily
adopted the state precedent set by Kriegler. The similarities were apparent:
18 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App. 1968).
19 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
20 It is to be noted that the damages in Schipper were personal while in Kriegler they were
property damages, but this issue had already been disposed of in California with the case of
Ghenna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 649, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101 (Ct. App. 1966);
see note 14 supra. It does, however, serve as another example of the continuing extension of
the strict liability doctrine.
21 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 383, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
22 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
,
, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752
23 Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d
(Ct. App. 1969).
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Longridge Estates was the mass-producer of the tract of lots just as Eichler and
Levitt were the mass-producers of homes.
The importance of Kriegler to Avner is obvious.24 The doctrine of strict
liability in tort for defective manufacture was once again extended to include
not only manufacturers and retailers, but also construction contractors. In both
Kriegler and Schipper, however, defective materials were the proximate cause of
injury, while in Avner the damages were caused by defective construction of
real estate lots. Thus, to apply strict liability, the court had to extend the theory
beyond encompassing defects in material or equipment so as to also include soil
defects in mass-developed real property.
Previously, the law in California was voiced by the 1968 case of Conolley
v. Bull:
The laws governing sales of real property, like those regulating landlord
and tenant relationships, have. developed along different lines from those
laws governing sales of commercial goods .... The property cases which
had developed the relevant governing principles for this area of the law
state no doctrine of strict liability in tort for sales of defective real estate.2 5
Conolley relied on.the case of Halliday v. Green,28 which noted three distinctions
between products liability and construction cases. The first difference mentioned
by Halliday was that a builder was not in a position to limit his
liability by express warranties and disclaimers." With this argument, defendant
Longridge submitted additionally that section 1113, California Civil Code,28
provides for certain warranties, and these do not include any in respect to the
condition of the soil. 9 Avner dearly rejected these arguments by citing the
California Supreme Court's decision in Greenman refusing "to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
[citations] make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."30
Halliday's second distinction is that it is considerably less difficult for an
occupant of a building to trace the source of a defect to the contractor than it
is for a consumer to reach a manufacturer."' Thus, the court indicates that
negligence should be the basis of relief since the defect should be easily traceable
to the contractor. Avner rejects this argument by equating the mass-production
of automobiles to homes or tracts of land and, therefore, logically destroying any
pretext that one type of mass-producer is more difficult to reach than another.
24 The California Supreme Court denied hearing in Kriegler and thus established the holding as a law of the state.
25 Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 196-97, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696 (Ct. App. 1968).
26 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Ct. App. 1966).
27 Id. at 486, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
28 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1113 (West 1954).
29 See Gustafson v. Dunnan, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 10, 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App.
1962); Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Royal Inden. Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 583, 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Ct.
App. 1960). But the Avner court correctly points out that in neither of these cases was the
doctrine of strict liability in tort pleaded or discussed.
30 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1963); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
,
, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633, 639 (Ct. App. 1969).
31 Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 486-87. 53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (Ct. App.

1966).
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Halliday's final distinction is that the owner of a building has a better opportunity to make a meaningful inspection than the purchaser of a retailed product. 2 Conolley adds to this argument by stating that real estate transactions
normally take a considerable time and thus afford prospective purchasers ample
time to inspect the property." Avner rejects this argument by detailing the intricacies involved in the development of the tract. A meaningful inspection cannot be made and considerable amounts of time are of no value when the defects which cause the damage are below the surface and not apparent to the
layman purchaser's eye. 4 In order to discover the defect in the lot, costly soils
tests would have to be made, and Avner refused to impose this obligation on
purchasers of mass-produced lots. 5
Having rejected Conolley's reasoning, which was based on Halliday's three
distinctions,3" the way was clear for Avner to extend the doctrine of strict liability
to defects in real estate lots. The court was unmoved by Longridge's contention
that the equation between the mass-production of houses and automobiles to
the development of lots is not valid. It stated that it is common knowledge that
modern techniques in the soil and grading area have disposed of the uncertainties
in the finished product. Various dangerous natural and latent conditions which
in the past could exist undetected are no longer considered a threat, since the
soils engineers are able to determine the stability of the soil from the tests of the
surface and subsurface." Avner decided that with the mass-production of lots,
"the overriding policy considerations are the same"3 and the court was
unable to distinguish the obligation of a builder to a purchaser for a defective radiant heating system installed in a cement floor (Kriegler, supra)
from the obligation of a manufacturer of a lot to a purchaser for defective
subsurface conditions resulting from improper filling and grading that cause
instability.3 9
The policy considerations which may have influenced the court's holding
in Avner are noteworthy. The court was aware that by placing the extra burden
of strict liability on the builder, simple economic operation would pass the added
cost to the consumer. The reasoning behind this risk distribution theory is that
the mass-producer is initially in a better position to absorb large losses. Damages
sustained due to a defective product would ruin the average consumer. Thus, the
added cost is an insurance paid by all to protect a few."° This theory was first
32

Id.

35

Id.

33 Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 196-97, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696-97 (Ct. App.
1968).
34 Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
,
, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (Ct.
App. 1969).
36 It is interesting to note that the courts in both Halliday and Conolley allowed recovery
on other grounds.
37 Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
,
, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (Ct.
App. 1969).
38 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965); Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d -,
-,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Ct. App. 1969).
39 Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
,
, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (Ct.
App. 1969).
40 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1966); Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAST. L.J. 9, 19-20, (1967).

[Vol. 45:533]

CASE COMMENTS

given attention by Justice Traynor, concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. 1 The risk distribution theory, however, was to lie dormant for almost twenty
years. Then in 1963 California took its giant step into strict liability with the
Greenman decision.

Justice Traynor there said:
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are power42
less to protect themselves.
This view is strongly reechoed by the courts in Schipper, Kriegler, and finally
Avner, which states:
"The public interest dictates that if such injury does result from a defective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible developer who
created the danger and who is in the better economic position to bear the
loss rather than by the injured party . . ,,4.
The emphasis in risk distribution once again is the inequality between the
giant mass-producer and the small consumer. The modern trend is for the continued growth of industry and construction. This gives added strength and
justification to the risk distribution theory and serves notice of increased acceptance and expansion of strict liability by the courts.
As the demand for houses increases, their mass-production continues to increase and become more profitable. Figures released by the President's Committee on Urban Houses revealed that the largest domestic merchant builder,
Levitt & Sons, Inc., the defendant in Schipper, produced 5,100 homes in 1967."
The largest developer of prefabricated homes, National Homes, manufactured
11,500 units in the same year.4 ' The figures projected for the 1970s are staggering." The majority of the purchasers of these homes will be lower- to middleincome families47 who need the protection or insurance of the strict liability in
tort doctrine. Just as the courts extended strict liability to such products as
automobiles when they became more readily available to those in the lower income bracket, they will do likewise in regard to the Avner doctrine.
41 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
42 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701,
377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
43 Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
,
,77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 636 (Ct. App.
1969).
44 PRESmENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 150 (1968).

45 Id.

46 The President's Committee on Urban Housing estimated that to provide standard
housing for the entire population, the American economy by 1978 will need to:
1. Build 13.4 million units for new, young families forming during the decade

ahead.

2. Replace or rehabilitate 8.7 million units that will deteriorate into substandard conditions.
3. Replace 3 million standard units that will be either accidentally destroyed
or purposefully demolished for nonresidential land users.
4. Build 1.6 million units to allow for enough vacancies for our increasing
mobile population. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HOME

47

8 (1968).
See generally, PRESMENT'S

COMMITTEE ON URBAN HousING,

A

DECENT HOME

(1968).
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Objection will naturally be made to such a far-reaching decision as Avner.
One contention will undoubtedly be that it imposes too harsh a doctrine upon
the construction contractor. The answer that his own good work will insure
against harsh imposition of the doctrine is unsatisfactory. The court in Kriegler,
paraphrasing Schipper and repeated by Avner, provided the only acceptable
answer:
[T]he imposition of strict liability principles on builders and developers
would not make them insurers of the safety of all who thereafter came on
the premises. In determining whether the house was defective, the test
would be one of reasonablenessrather than perfection. (Emphasis added.)
By using the term "reasonableness," the precedent cases may well have introduced an element of confusion because its connotation almost automatically
leads one to think in terms of a failure to exercise a proper standard of care.
Technically speaking, reasonableness, of course, is unnecessary in strict liability,
and all that is required is a defect which causes injury. What the courts are
saying, however, is that they are going to be reasonable in designating what conditions are and are not defects. The importance, then, is not whether the contractor is reasonable in building or developing his project, but if a condition
which can reasonably be termed a defect caused the injury.
A final question is raised. Avner neither specifically mentions the number
of lots produced by Longridge Estates nor designates it a mass-producer. Has
Avner extended the strict liability doctrine to include something less than a
mass-producer? Two factors indicate that it has not.
First, even though Avner never specifically labels Longridge Estates a massproducer, it relies upon Schipper and Eichler as precedents. Both of those cases
predicated liability solely upon the fact that the defendants were mass-producers.
The court relates the Avner facts to these two cases based on the policy considerations mentioned previously.
Secondly, the risk distribution theory, which was a primary reason for the
initial imposition of strict liability on mass-producers, does not apply to the individual contractor who produces only one or two houses per year. Such contractors are usually in no better financial position than the buyer to absorb a
loss. Although they will enjoy higher prices for their houses as the risk theory
drives the market prices up throughout the industry, only mass-producers will
sell enough to offset any possible loss in strict liability. Thus, if the primary
reason for imposing the doctrine does not apply to smaller contractors, logically
strict liability should not be imposed. As one New Jersey case stated: "Schipper
is not applicable to an isolated sale of a house - Schipper should be applied
only to sellers engaged in the mass production and sale of houses .... ""
Despite the above reasoning, Avner's failure to label Longridge Estates a
mass-producer has at least opened the door to strict liability recovery in a real
property case to something less than a mass-production situation. This is true
,
,74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (Ct.
48 Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d
App. 1969).
49 Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62, 67-68, 229 A.2d 823, 826 (1967).
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because Auner has been accepted "° and the trend in strict liability is certainly
toward continued extention. However, any attempt to draw the line as to what
should be sufficient production to apply to the doctrine is futile, and each "in
between" case will have to be examined on an individual basis. Thus, while
it is desirable to impose equal responsibility on all mass-producers, if the defendant is too small the reasons for finding recovery in Avner are simply not
present and no relief should be granted under its principles.
James F. Rittinger

LABOR LAW - ATToRNEYs WHO ENGAGE rN AND RECEIVE PAYMENTS FOR
"PERSUADER" ACTiVTIES MUST INCLUDE IN THEIR ANNUAL REPORTS STATEMENTS OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR SERVICES TO ALL THEIR LABOR

Edward Price, John Bernard Nelson, and Franklin
R. Sears were attorneys specializing in the practice of labor relations law. On

RLATIONS CLIENTS.-John

behalf of a small number of their clients, they engaged in activities within the
scope, of "persuader" or "information securing" activities as set forth in section
203(b) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [LMRDA],
thereby subjecting themselves to the reporting 'requirements of that section.
Within thirty days after each persuader agreement, the attorneys filed reports

setting forth in detail the names of the parties to and the terms and conditions of
the agreement. In their annual reports, however, they disclosed only the amounts
of receipts and disbursements pursuant to such persuader agreements. The Secretary of Labor insisted that the attorneys had failed to comply with LMRDA
and ruled administratively that their annual reports must include statements of
receipts and disbursements on behalf of not only "persuader" clients, but also
all their labor relations clients. The attorneys sued in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas for a declaratoy judgment that they
were not required to include in their reports receipts and disbursements on behalf of their "nonpersuader" clients. The district court, however, refused to
grant declaratory judgment and accepted the Secretary's ruling.2 The attorneylitigants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The court of appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed and held: attorneys or labor
relations consultants who during the course of the year receive payments pursuant to engaging in persuader or information securing activities, as defined
in section 203 (b) of the LMRDA, must include in their annual reports a statement of receipts and disbursements in connection with all labor relations work for
all their clients. Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969).
Sections 203(b),' 203(c), 4 and 204' were included in the Labor Manage50 The California Supreme Court has denied Longridge Estates' request for hearing and
thus Avner is solid precedent within the state.
1

29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).

2 Price v. Wirtz, No. CA 4-63-84 (N.D. Tex., Feb. 8, 1965), aff'd, 412 F.2d 647
(5th Cir. 1969).
3 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964). This section provides:
Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an employer
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ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 as part of an attempt to remedy
abuses and questionable practices involving employers and their "labor relations consultants." Many abuses had been uncovered by the McClellan Committee hearings.
Section 203(b) requires any person, including an attorney or consultant,
who undertakes pursuant to an agreement with the employer-client: (1) to
persuade employees as to the exercise of their organizational or collective bargaining rights, or (2) to secure information for the employer concerning the
activities of employees or of a labor organization in reference to a labor dispute
involving the employer, to file two types of reports. The first type of report must
be filed with the Secretary of Labor within thirty days after the attorney or consultant enters into each "persuader" agreement. It must specify the parties to,
and the terms and provisions of, the agreement. The second type of report
must be filed annually with respect to each fiscal year during which payments
are received by the consultant in connection with the performance of persuader
agreements and must contain a statement: (A) of the reporting party's "receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations advice or services,
designating the sources thereof, and (B) of its disbursements of any kind, in
connection with such services and the purposes thereof."8
The provisions of section 203 (b), however, must be construed harmoniously
with the provisions of sections 203(c) and 204. Section 203(c) provides that
nothing in section 203 may be construed to require any person to file a report
undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly (1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of
employees or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving
such employer, except information for use solely in conjunction with an
administrative or arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial proceeding;
shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or arrangement a report
with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal
officers, containing the name under which such person is engaged in doing business
and the address of its principal office, and a detailed statement of the terms and
conditions of such agreement or arrangement. Every such person shall file annually,
with respect to each fiscal year during which payments were made as a result of such
an agreement or arrangement, a report with the Secretary, signed by its president
and treasurer or corresponding principal officers, containing a statement (A) of its
receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations advice or services,
designating the sources thereof, and '(B) of its disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof. In each case such information
shall be set forth in such categories as the Secretary may prescribe.
4 Id. § 433(c). This section provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or other
person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or
agreeing to give advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to represent such
employer before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with
respect to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder.
5 Id. § 434. This section provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to require an attorney who
is a member in good standing of the bar of any State, to include in any report required to be filed pursuant to the provisions of the chapter any information communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate
attorney-client relationship.

6

Id. § 433(b).
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"by reason of" his giving advice to the employer or representing the employer in
judicial, administrative, or collective bargaining proceedings. Section 204 exempts an attorney from including in any report required to be filed any information communicated by the client to the attorney in the course of a legitimate
attorney-client relationship. Thus, the issue arises as to whether the provisions
of sections 203 (c) and 204 exempt the attorney engaged in persuader activity
from reporting receipts and disbursements in connection with labor relations
work for his nonpersuader clients.
Price is the most recent development in a series of three cases dealing with
the proper interpretation of sections 203(b), 203(c), and 204 of the LMRDA.
The other two cases are Douglas v. Wirtz7 and Wirtz v. Fowler.' In Douglas
the attorney-plaintiff, a specialist in labor law, on three separate occasions spoke
directly to the assembled employees of one of his clients. His activities on those
occasions fell within the scope of the definition of persuader activities reportable
under section 203 (b). He filed the requisite thirty-day reports, but in his annual
report he set forth only those receipts and disbursements connected with his
activities on behalf of persuader clients. He refused to comply with the demand
of the Secretary of Labor that he amend his annual reports to show his receipts
and disbursements from all his labor law clients and sought in the district court
a declaratory judgment holding erroneous the Secretary's interpretation of sections 203(b), 203(c), and 204: of the LMRDA. The Secretary contended that
once a person engages in activities reportable under section 203 (b), a full annual
disclosure of receipts and disbursements is required with regard to all labor law
practice of that person and that no exemption is provided by section 203(c)
or section 204. In granting declaratory judgment for the plaintiff, the district
court observed that Congress, in passing the LMRDA, was not striking at the
services listed in section 203 (c) (nonpersuader activities).' Rather, the purpose
of section 203 was to focus attention, through reporting and disclosure, on activities such as those listed in section 203(b), which, if unpublicized, might give
rise to unsavory undercover deals in the labor-management field.' The district court concluded that
the annual report regarding receipts and disbursements was intended to
effect and be a supplementary report regarding activities covered in the
thirty day report, that is show what money came in by reason of the arrangement and where the money went."
Furthermore, no report, thirty-day or annual, was required with reference to
regular, open, and recognized labor law practice of the type described in section
203 (c), irrespective of whether or not the attorney engaged in reportable activities under section 203 (b).2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, however, adhered to the government's interpretation and reversed. The
Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the word "advice" in section 203(b) (A),
7 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g 232 F. Supp. 348 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
8 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'g 236 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
9 232 F. Supp. 348, 352 (M.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965).
10 id.
11 Id. at 353-54.
12 Id. at 354.
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which requires a statement by the attorney of receipts from employers on account
of labor relations advice or services." The court pointed out that there is no
reference to advice in section 203(b) (1) or (2), the "persuasion" and "information securing" dauses. Consequently, the language of section 203 (b) literally
requires a report of payments for independent advice not connected with persuader activity unless the requirement of the annual report is narrowed by
section 203 (c).4 Section 203 (c), of course, appears literally to exempt the
attorney from filing a report by reason of his giving advice to the employerclient. The court, therefore, held that the exemption provided by section 203 (c)
is
an excusal of any filing whatsoever "be reason of [the attorney's] giving
[T]he quoted phrase is to be understood
or agreeing to give advice" ......
to declare that advice in itself and alone does not create an obligation
to report. But the two sections together declare that when persuasion
advice occur in the same fiscal
services or receipts therefor and independent
5
year, all of them must be reported.'
Wirtz v. Fowler directly controverted the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Douglas. In Fowler, the attorney-litigants and their associates spoke to assembled groups of employees of several of their clients in reference to upcoming
union representation elections. The Secretary of Labor claimed that they had
engaged in persuader activities on behalf of these clients and demanded that the
attorneys fie the required reports under section 203(b), including in their
annual reports a statement of receipts and disbursements in connection with work
for all their labor relations clients during the fiscal year. The attorneys brought
suit against the Secretary for declaratory judgment contending initially that they
were not required to report any of their activities since, at the time, they were
acting openly as attorneys and were exempted from the reporting requirements
by section 203 (b) (2), 203 (c), and 204. In the alternative, they contended that
reporting and disclosing financial transactions with all their labor clients would
transgress upon both their nonpersuader clients' rights and upon plaintiffs' own
rights as attorneys. In granting the declaratory judgment, the district court accepted the plaintiffs' initial contention 6 Consequently, the issue raised in plaintiffs' alternative contention was left unresolved. The district judge did, however, observe that the Secretary's
interpretation plays havoc with the obvious purpose of Section 203(c) ...
to protect the attorney-client relationship from disclosure within the enumerated categories....
This interpretation of the Defendant Secretary reduces Section 203(c)
- that nonreportable undertakings do not
of the Act to a mere truism
17
give rise to a duty to report.
On appeal a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
13
14
15
16
17

353 F.2d at 32.
Id.
Id.
236 F. Supp. 22, 34 (S.D. Fla. 1964), rev'd, 372 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 34 n.4.
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Fifth Circuit reversed the holding of the district court. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, directly confronted the question regarding the scope of the annual report.
The court, one judge dissenting, held that while the att~rney-plaintiffs must file
reports in connection with all persuader activities under section 203(b), regardless of whether such activities were performed openly, they could not be
required to file in their annual reports statements as to receipts and disbursements in connection with labor relations services to clients for whom they had
performed no persuader activities."8 The Fifth Circuit argued:
A contrary conclusion would mean that when an employer retains
an attorney solely to perform nonpersuader activity (e.g., giving advice
or representation in court proceedings) and when that attorney subsequently engages in persuader activities on behalf of another employer,
the attorney's nonpersuader arrangement with the first employer would
be subject to complete disclosure. In the Court's view the purposes of the
reporting requirements, as revealed in the legislative history, do not justify
such a harsh result.1 9
Price v. Wirtz, therefore, was decided in the light of a direct controversy
between the holdings of the only two appellate courts that had construed the
reporting requirements of section 203(b) with reference to sections .203(c)
and 204. The majority resolved this conflict by accepting the contentions of
the Secretary of Labor and rejecting the previous ruling of the Fifth Circuit
panel in Fowler. In so doing, the majority rested almost entirely on the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Douglas. The court first noted that the annual report in
203(b) must include a statement of receipts from employers "on account of
labor relations advice or services. '20 It then viewed the meaning of "advice"
as used in 203(c) and concurred with the Fourth Circuit that the word referred
to "advice apart from the statutory persuader activities.""1 The court, therefore,
reasoned:
When that same meaning is needed to give sense or purpose to its use
§ 203(b), it leads to the conclusion that disclosure for all labor relation
clients is the price the Attorney-persuader
must pay if he wishes to engage
22
in those [persuader] activities.
The majority argued further that it was consistent with the main purpose of
section 203 and its principal sanction of public disclosure "to turn the spotlight
on the lawyer who wanted not only to serve clients in labor relations matters
encompassed within § 203(c), but who wanted also to wander into the legislatively suspect field of a persuader."2 The court stated:
It boils down to this. As long as the attorney limits himself to the
activities set forth in § 203(c), he need not report. Engaging in such
18
19

372 F.2d at 333.
Id. at 333-34.

20 412 F.2d at 649.
21 Id. at 649-50. The Fourth Circuit's reasoning for its

cussed in the text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
22 412 F.2d at 650.

23 Id.

interpretation of

"advice' is dis-
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advice or collective bargaining does not give rise to a duty to report. No
report is set in motion "by reason of" his doing those things. What sets
the reporting in motion is performing persuader activities. Once that
duty arises, § 203(c) does not insulate from reporting the matters in §
203 (b) from non-persuader clients.24
The majority's decision to overrule Fowler and accept the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Douglas was premised upon the belief that the grammatical interpretation and legislative history of section 203 demanded such a holding. While
the court's conclusion appears logical, the premises used to reach it are somewhat
tenuous. The statutory language can be interpreted just as easily to support the
attorney-litigants' position. Furthermore, the legislative history of section 203
does not clearly reveal a Congressional intent in favor of the court's holding.
The statute does not require the grammatical construction adopted by the
court in Price. The majority in Price, following Douglas, based its interpretation of 203(b) and (c) on the assumption that the word "advice" in 203(b) (A)
referred to independent advice, unconnected with persuader activities. Section
203(b), however, requires a thirty-day report specifying all the terms of an
employer-consultant agreement when an object (not the object) of the agreement is persuasion. 2 If the agreement involves in its terms both advice and
persuasion, receipts on account of that advice are clearly reportable. Consequently, section 203(b) may be properly construed as requiring receipts and
disbursements connected with section 203(c) activities performed on behalf
of a persuader client to be reported in the annual report.2 This requirement,
however, does not necessarily extend to receipts and disbursements for services
and advice to clients for whom no persuader activity has been performed.
Section 203 (c) provides the exemption for those agreements that do not involve
persuader activity.
Moreover, as Judge Dyer asserts in his dissent, the majority in Price has
extended the scope of the statute beyond Congressional intent. The purpose
of section 203 of the LMRDA, Judge Dyer feels, is to publicize persuader
activity, not nonpersuader activity." Congress was concerned in the wake of
the McClellan Committee hearings with the activities of "management middlemen." These consultants frequently engaged in what the Act now classifies
persuader activities pursuant to a secret agreement with the employer, while
24 Id. at 651.
25 Note, Labor Law: Two Views of a Labor Relations Consultant's Duty to Report under
Section 203 of the LMRDA, 65 MicH. L. REv. 752, 756 (1967).
26 This was the position taken in Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315, 332 n.35 (5th Cir. 1966).
27 This point was stressed in the Senate Committee Report on S. 1555:
Under section 103(b) [the predecessor of 203(b)] every person who enters into an
agreement with an employer to persuade employees as regards the exercise of their
right to organize and bargain collectively, or to supply an employer with information concerning the activity of the employees or labor organizations in connection
with a labor dispute would be required to file a detailed report. An attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice, taking part in collective bargaining, and appearing in court or administrative proceedings would not be included
among those required to file reports under this subsection [§ 103(b)]. Specific
exemption for persons giving this type of advice is contained in subsection (c) of
section 103 [now 203(c) of the LMRDA]. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 2328 (1959) (emphasis added).
28 412 F.2d at 652 (dissenting opinion).

[Vol. 45:541]

CASE COMMENTS

pretending to represent the best interest of the employees. As a result, section
203(b) was enacted to enable employees to determine the true identities of
these middlemen and the nature of their activities. Neither the legislative history
of the relevant sections of the LMRDA nor the policy statement of the Act29
makes any clear suggestion that Congress intended public disclosure to reach
nonpersuader activities performed by attorneys for nonpersuader clients. The
Senate bill"0 required only an annual report pursuant to persuader agreements 1
That report was to contain: (1) the name of the persuader, (2) receipts of any
kind on account of labor relations advice or services, (3) disbursements of any
kind in connection with such services; and (4) a detailed statement of the terms
of the persuader agreement.3 2 In the course of debate, S. 1555 was amended
to require a thirty-day, rather than an annual, report and later again amended
to include both a thirty-day and an annual report.3 The Senate Committee
gave no indication, however, that it was concerned with anything but the timing
and practicality of the reports or that it intended the separate annual report
to include any transactions not covered by the previous combined report. Furthermore, as the dissent observes, Congress took great care to insert in the Act a
"multiplicity of exemptions and protections," 4 most notably sections 203(c)
and 204. 5 The purpose of these exemptions was to prevent the spotlight of
publicity from being focused on areas that Congress felt improper and unnecessary to explore, specifically advisory or representative activities carried on
by an attorney or consultant on behalf of his client."s It is somewhat difficult to
reconcile this cautions approach of Congress in enacting the reporting requirements of section 203 with the majority's decision in Price. :
Since neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of sections
29 The policy considerations that influenced Congress in passing the LM]RDA are set forth
in 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), which states in pertinent part:
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management fields that there have been a number of instances of breaches of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe
high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests
of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants and their officers and representatives.
30 S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The legislative history of the LMRDA is
quite complicated. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Note, supra note

25, at
31
32
33

752 n.1.
See Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315, 334 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id.
Senator McClellan in proposing an amendment to require a thirty-day report said:
I think that if the employer is to be permitted to employ consultants - and he

certainly should be permitted to employ them - when he employs them for the purposes set forth in section 103 of the bill, knowledge of such employment should come

to public attention at the time or shortly thereafter - within thirty days thereafter
- rather than a year afterwards, or longer. 105 CONG. REc. 6517 (1959) (emphasis
added). It is clear that Senator McClellan was not concerned with disclosure of activities
other than persuader activities and that his main concern was the timing of the reports.
34 412 F.2d at 652 (dissenting opinion).
35 Senator Goldwater, who introduced section 204 of the Act as an amendment to S.
1555, was particularly concerned with safeguarding the attorney-client relationship:
As a layman, I believe there should be a perpetuation of the sanctity of relations
between attorney and client. I know that if I were involved in a situation in which
an attorney was representing me, and a report had to be made, I would not want all
of the intimate details of communications between the attorney and me to become
public property. 105 CoNG. REc. 6558 (1959).
36

Id.
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203 and 204 provides compelling support for either the position taken by the
Secretary or the position of the attorney-litigants, the major consideration in
evaluating the decision is the effect it will have on the rights of labor relations
consultants and their clients. The decision in Price represents an encroachment
upon the rights of labor relations attorneys and their employer-clients and upon
the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. Both the attorney
and the employer are faced with a dilemma as a result of Price. The attorney is
confronted with the choice of refusing to represent any persuader clients or
being compelled to report regarding all his labor relations work. He may, thus,
lose clients who desire that their affairs be kept strictly confidential. Since reported persuader activities are often neither illegal nor unfair, there seems to
be no real justification for placing a burden of this nature on the attorney."
With regard to the employer-client, as long as he does not make payments reportable under section 203 (a)," he has a right to privacy in his business affairs.
Under Price, however, if a client retains an attorney to perform nonreportable
but confidential labor relations services and, subsequently, during the fiscal year,
the attorney engages in a single persuader activity, the attorney in his annual
report must disclose the receipts and disbursements and services to that nonpersuader client. 9 It is alien to the concept of mutuality of reporting in the
Act,4' as well as somewhat illogical, that information which the nonpersuader
client cannot be compelled to disclose - and which may provide a starting
point for investigations into areas such as taxes and labor practices - can be
discovered from his attorney.4 Judge Dyer's strongest argument in his dissent
characterizes the majority opinion's impact on the rights of those involved in
the labor relations field:
That labor relations employers have the right to speak to attorneys regarding their business labor relations, to associate with attorneys for lawful
legal advice and to have private affairs of a lawful nature protected from
governmental intrusion is beyond dispute. That the attorneys as well as
the employers enjoy the same rights seems also beyond dispute. That the
particular matters, financial affairs, including the amounts and sources
of receipts and the amounts and purposes of disbursements, are of a con-

37

The Senate Committee reported as regards the nature of "persuader" activities:
All of the activities required to be reported by this section [203] are not illegal nor
are they unfair labor practices. However, since most of them are disruptive of harmonious labor relations and fall into a gray area, the committee believes that if an employer
or consultant indulges in them, they should be reported. S. REP. No. 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2328 (1959).
38 29 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1964). This section of the LMRDA requires an employer to
report his payments to an attorney or consultant for persuader or information securing
activities.
39 412 F.2d at 652 (dissenting opinion).
40 The LMRDA contemplates reports from those on both ends of a reportable transaction.
Section 203(d) of the Act is illustrative:
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require an employer to
file a report under subsection (a) of this section unless he has made an expenditure,
payment, loan, agreement, or arrangement of the kind described therein. Nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to require any other person to file a
report under subsection (b) of this section unless he was a party to an agreement
or arrangement of the kind described therein. 29 U.S.C. § 433(d) (1964).
41 412 F.2d at 653 (dissenting opinion).
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fidential nature should be equally clear. And that disclosure by the atnecessarily expose and affect the client-employer is just as
torney 4must
2

certain.

By disregarding this rationale, the majority in Price v. Wirtz reached an undesirable result.

John J. Dawson

42

Id. at 654.
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